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Daniel M. Brister 
 
President Obama established the first––and only––national 
monument in the Atlantic Ocean on September 15, 2016. Located 130 
miles southeast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and comprised of 4,913 
square miles of marine ecosystems rich in biodiversity, the protected area 
includes four underwater mountains and three submarine canyons. 
Plaintiff commercial lobster and fishing associations, seeking to overturn 
the designation, asserted that the Antiquities Act does not permit a 
president to establish marine national monuments. The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia disagreed, upholding a president’s authority 
to protect offshore areas and vast ecosystems as objects of scientific 
interest, and dismissing the Lobstermen’s case in a memorandum opinion 
splashed with maritime references. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross examined 
whether President Obama exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act 
of 1906 (“Antiquities Act” or “Act”) in establishing the Northeast 
Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument (“Monument”).1 
Claiming injury from commercial fishing restrictions implemented under 
the Monument’s management plan, the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s 
Association and other fishing associations (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President, the 
Secretaries of Interior and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (collectively, “Defendants”).2 
In arguing the President exceeded his authority under the 
Antiquities Act, Plaintiffs challenged textual definitions of terms within 
the Act and the breadth of the area set aside for the Monument.3 
Defendants refuted those allegations, asked the court to dismiss the case 
as nonjusticiable, and asserted the President did not exceed the statutory 
authority granted to him under the Antiquities Act.4 Upon review, the court 
determined Plaintiffs failed to prove the President exceeded his powers 
under the Act and issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the case.5 
 
 
                                               
1.  Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n v. Ross, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 U.S.     
Dist. Lexis 172151, 2018 WL 4853901, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2018). 
2.  Id. at *6-9. 
3.  Id. at *4-9 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012)). 
4. Id.  
5.  Id. at *14. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Congress passed the Antiquities Act in 1906, granting the 
President the authority to proclaim “objects of historic or scientific 
interest” as national monuments.6 Since President Theodore Roosevelt’s  
utilization of the Antiquities Act to preserve the Grand Canyon in 1908, 
courts and presidents have interpreted the Act  to allow the withdrawal and 
protection of vast tracts of land owned or controlled by the federal 
government based on their cultural or scientific value.7 In all, presidents 
have declared 157 national monuments of varying size and purpose.8 
In October 2016, President Obama established the Monument in 
the northwestern Atlantic Ocean, in part to protect a diverse array of 
marine creatures and habitats, including corals, squid, octopus, whales, 
tuna, billfish, and sharks.9 As part of the Monument designation, Obama 
directed the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to develop a 
management plan for the Monument within three years.10 More notably, 
however, he required the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to 
encourage scientific research and exploration, prohibit oil and gas 
exploration, and restrict commercial fishing within the Monument.11 
Concerned with such economic restrictions, Defendants brought suit in 
March 2017.12 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Plaintiffs, in challenging President Obama’s statutory authority to 
declare the Monument, advanced three overarching arguments.13 First, that 
Congress, in granting the President the right to protect “lands” as national 
monuments under the Antiquities Act, did not intend for marine 
ecosystems or areas of ocean to qualify for the Act’s protections.14 Second, 
that the Monument, which lies more than 130 miles off the coast of New 
England, is not under the complete control of the United States, as required 
by the Antiquities Act.15 Finally, Plaintiffs argued that the Monument is 
overly large and therefore in violation of the Antiquities Act’s requirement 
that monuments be limited to the smallest area necessary for their proper 
management and protection.16 
                                               
6.  Id. at *5. 
7. Id. at *4-6. 
8.  Id. at *5. 
9. Id. at *7.  
10. Id.  
11. Id.   
12. Id. at *9.  
13.  Id. at *4. 
14.  Id. at *15.  
15.  Id. at *27. 
16.  Id. at *46. 
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A. Oceans as “Lands” Under the Antiquities Act 
 
Citing Antiquities Act language allowing the President to 
establish monuments on “lands” controlled by the federal government, 
Plaintiffs argued that oceans are not lands as mentioned in the Act, and 
therefore fall outside its scope.17 After acknowledging the initial appeal of 
this argument, the court nevertheless found itself “buffeted by the strong 
winds of Supreme Court precedent, executive practice, and ordinary 
meaning.”18 Citing three U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the district court 
held that submerged lands and their overlying waters may indeed be 
considered “lands” under the Antiquities Act.19  
The court also relied on numerous instances where presidents 
withdrew submerged lands as part of national monument designations 
without Congressional objection.20 According to the court, examples of 
such unchallenged national monument creations abound, including 
Devil’s Hole, Channel Islands, Glacier Bay, Fort Jefferson, Buck Island 
Reef, and the Papahānaumokuākea Marine Monument.21 The court 
interpreted these monuments as evidence of presidential authority to 
protect submerged lands under the Antiquities Act.22  
Finally, the court turned to the plain meaning of the word “land,” 
citing several dictionary definitions to show that the term includes not only 
dry land, but also lands on the seafloor.23 Moreover, the district court 
offered a particularly relevant quote from the Supreme Court: “Lands are 
not the less land for being covered with water.”24 Finding the issue well 
settled, the court held that “[t]he Antiquities Act reaches lands both dry 
and wet.”25 
Plaintiffs next asserted the Antiquities Act does not apply to 
maritime areas because: (1) the National Marine Sanctuaries Act 
(“NMSA”) impliedly repealed the Antiquities Act with respect to 
maritime areas; and (2) that, in passing the NMSA, Congress tacitly 
                                               
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at *15. 
19.  Id.; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976) 
(providing that a pool of water and the underlying groundwater within the Death 
Valley National Monument were subject to the president’s power under the Act); 
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 33 (1978) (“Although the Antiquities Act 
refers to ‘lands,’ . . . it also authorizes the reservation of waters located on or over 
federal lands.”); Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 103 (2005) (“It is clear . . . that 
the Antiquities Act empowers the President to reserve submerged lands.”). 
20.  Id. at *18. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. at *19. 
23. Id. at *20.  
24. Id. at *20-21 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 U.S. 646, 
660 (1900)) (emphasis in original). 
25.  Id. at *21. 
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declared the Antiquities Act only relevant to terrestrial areas.26 The court, 
liberally employing maritime metaphors, found that “[n]either argument . 
. . holds water.”27 First, the court cited Watt v. Alaska, which held 
unfavorable “repeals by implication.”28 Although statutory repeals may be 
inferred when a subsequent statute explicitly contradicts an existing one, 
the court noted that, in addition to the NMSA’s failure to mention the 
Antiquities Act, the NMSA’s express intent is to “complement[] existing 
regulatory authorities.”29 As for Plaintiffs’ second contention of the 
Antiquities Act’s singularly terrestrial relevance, the court found it 
“provide[d] the Lobstermen’s boat little headway” because subsequent 
acts may confer additional protections without rendering existing acts 
meaningless.30 Finding the Antiquities Act unaffected by the subsequent 
enactment of the NMSA, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ notion that the 
“Monument exceed[ed] the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act 
because it lies entirely beneath the waves.”31 
 
B. Government Control of the Lands at Issue 
 
Plaintiffs’ next argument “haul[ed] in no more catch” than the 
previous one,32 wherein Plaintiffs maintained that the Monument was 
invalid because the Antiquities Act only gives the President authority to 
establish national monuments on “lands owned or controlled by the 
Federal Government.”33 Where the previous argument centered on the 
definition of “lands,” this one focused on the words “owned or 
controlled.”34 Plaintiffs urged a narrow interpretation of “control” as 
meaning “complete control” and asserted that the government lacked such 
control over the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), which extends to 200 
miles from the coast.35 
Returning to the dictionary to demonstrate common usage of the 
word “control” contemplates something less than absolute dominion,36 the 
court held that establishment of the EEZ37 and passage of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act conveyed adequate control of the oceanic 
lands at issue to permit their protection under the Antiquities Act as a 
national monument.38 In assessing the adequacy of the government’s 
control  over  the  EEZ,  the  court  considered  three  points.39   First,   the
                                               
26. Id.  
27. Id. at *22.  
28.  Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 at 267 (1981)). 
29.  Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(2)). 
30.  Id. 
31. Id. at *27.  
32. Id.   
33.  Id. (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)). 
34. Id.  
35. Id. at *37.  
36. Id. at *28. 
37.  Id. at *37. 
38 Id. at *35 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).  
39. Id. at *36.  
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government’s regulation of fisheries and resource extractive industries 
within the EEZ evinced substantial control.40  Second, the government’s 
specific authority to regulate the area for purposes of environmental 
conservation revealed a strong level of control.41 Third, no other entity or 
person exerted an equal measure of control over the EEZ as did the U.S. 
government.42  According to the court, these three considerations, taken 
together, demonstrate that “the federal government controls the EEZ for 
purposes of the Antiquities Act.”43 
 
C. Smallest Area Compatible with Proper Care and Management 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs argued that the Monument’s boundaries 
violated the Act’s “smallest compatible area”44 stipulation because they 
“b[ore] little relation to the canyons and seamounts” themselves and 
“encompass[ed] areas that are dozens of miles from the nearest 
seamount.”45 In other words, Plaintiffs claimed the Monument protects 
excessive areas of ocean outside the specific features named in the 
presidential proclamation establishing the Monument.46 Going a step 
further, they also asserted that ecosystems and natural features are not 
“objects” under the Antiquities Act and their inclusion in the Monument 
exceeded the Act’s authority.47 
The court rejected these arguments because Plaintiffs incorrectly 
assumed the canyons and seamounts were the only areas worthy of 
protection.48 According to the court, the presidential proclamation clearly 
established that the canyons, seamounts, and the “natural resources and 
ecosystems in and around them” constituted “objects of historic and 
scientific interest” under the Act.49 The court cited both D.C. Circuit and 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent in support of its assertion that large 
ecosystems, rather than just individual objects of curiosity, are worthy of 
protection under the Antiquities Act.50 In granting the government’s 
motion to dismiss, the court held that, just as President Roosevelt had acted 
within his authority under the Antiquities Act in establishing Grand 
Canyon National Monument in 1908, so had President Obama acted within 
his authority in establishing the Canyons and Seamounts National 
Monument in 2016.51 
                                               
40.  Id. at *37. 
41. Id.  
42. Id. at *40.   
43. Id. at *42.  
44. Id. at *45 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b)).  
45.  Id. at *47. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. at *48. 
48.  Id. at *49. 
49.  Id. at *47. 
50.  Id. at *48 (citing Alaska, 545 U.S. at 103; Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 
141-142; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-456 (1920); Tulare County v. 
Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
51.  Id. at *4. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
At a time of significant uncertainty for the Antiquities Act, Massachusetts 
Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross nonetheless represents an affirmation of 
the Act’s authority and breadth. This district court decision is momentous, 
both because of its determination of executive authority to establish 
national monuments at sea, and by its affirmation of presidential authority 
to protect vast ecosystems as objects of scientific interest under the 
Antiquities Act. Because the decision is likely to be appealed to the Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, it has the potential—along with the 
ongoing litigation over Bears Ears and Escalante National Monuments—
to have a profound effect on the future of the Antiquities Act. Despite the 
conclusion’s delivery via memorandum opinion, the holding could have a 
watershed impact on the future management of lands owned or controlled 
by the federal government, both on- and off-shore.  Formatted: Font color: Auto
